CISA has updated its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog to include a new, actively exploited SQL injection flaw in Arista VeloCloud Orchestrator. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-114625, allows attackers to potentially gain total control of affected assets.
CISA, together with the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security and other partners, has released joint guidance aimed at helping organizations track and control how much they spend on tokens when using outside AI (described as 'super intelligence') services. The agencies point out that letting token usage run unchecked can drive up costs unpredictably, slow or interrupt service, and leave systems vulnerable to attacks designed to drain a victim's token budget or wallet. To counter this, the guidance lays out steps covering how tokens get allocated, how workflows are built for efficiency, how prompts are written, how caching and reused context can cut waste, how data is trimmed before it's sent to a model, and how usage should be tracked over time.
GitLab disclosed a critical vulnerability (CVE-2026-110264, CVSS 10) in its regex compiler that lets an unauthenticated attacker run arbitrary code on affected GitLab servers. The flaw is an integer overflow and affects a broad range of GitLab Community and Enterprise Edition versions. GitLab also patched 2 high, 5 medium and 4 low severity issues in the same release, and published detection rules for exploitation attempts.
Amazon's MadPot honeypot network recorded an exploitation attempt against what is now tracked as CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619 — nicknamed PHP2Shell — on October 17, 2026, four days before the vendor publicly disclosed the flaw. The request came from a commercial anonymization network, suggesting a threat actor had working exploit code ahead of the official embargo lift. When the embargo ended on October 21 at 1400 UTC, AWS says proof-of-concept code and real attack traffic hit its sensors within hours, from several distinct sets of infrastructure. AWS argues this points to a structural shift: AI-assisted analysis is making it faster to turn a patch or advisory into a working exploit, shrinking the old assumption that most attacks follow a public PoC.
Cloudflare has launched full transaction detection and response rules for its web application firewall, which evaluate both the HTTP request and the origin's response to confirm whether an attack actually succeeded. Previously the WAF only inspected incoming requests, which could miss exploits that only reveal themselves in the response (e.g. leaked file contents) or create false positives when blocking based on request signatures alone. The first managed protections target the recently disclosed php2shell vulnerability, and the feature is generally available to all customers, including Free plans.
Cisco Talos reports a sharp rise in attacks that abuse legitimate infrastructure — collaboration tools, retailers' order-notification systems, registration forms, and even bounce/delivery-failure reports — to smuggle phishing content past email authentication checks. Talos tracked abuse across more than 25 legitimate platforms in the past year, including two campaigns impersonating Staples and Dell order confirmations that together generated roughly 1,400 messages pushing victims to call attacker-controlled phone numbers. The report also describes 'list bombing' and bounce-message abuse as emerging delivery vectors for malicious lures.
NVIDIA has detailed Sentry, a new security framework that sits outside an AI agent's reach, enforcing policy and watching behavior from a dedicated hardware trust domain on BlueField-4 DPUs. The idea is simple: even if an agent is compromised or goes off-script while using tools and credentials, Sentry keeps watching and can cut it off because it doesn't depend on the host OS the agent runs on. Two components do the work — DOCA Tower, a proxy that inspects and authorizes every agent network request, and DOCA Argus, which reads live memory to understand what's actually running. When something looks wrong, the system can quarantine the agent within milliseconds, without needing the agent or the host to cooperate.
Anthropic published details on how it curbed 'illicit distillation' — large-scale covert operations that scrape Claude's reasoning transcripts to train rival models cheaply. New measures, including reasoning summarization, 'preserved thinking' for new API accounts, and a two-stage classifier system, reportedly cut the volume of usable reasoning data extracted by distillers by 10-100x. Anthropic says a Chinese lab, Zhipu, used distillation (including attempts against Claude) to build GLM-5.3, which US assessors found to be the most cyber-capable open-weight model released so far with safeguards that are easily bypassed.
Microsoft announced an expansion of its Project Perception security framework to address risks from autonomous AI agents, framing them as a new category of 'insider' that needs distinct identity, permission, and risk controls. The update introduces Dynamic Permissions (least-privilege, task-scoped, time-bound access), Dynamic Agent Risk (continuous risk scoring based on behavior drift and context), and Dynamic Conditional Access (graduated responses from narrowing access to full runtime isolation). Microsoft is also extending discovery and identity support (Microsoft Entra Agent ID) to 60 types of local agents, including Claude Code, OpenAI Codex, and GitHub Copilot, and introducing 'Guardian Agents' that monitor and respond to risky agent behavior at machine speed.
NIST's Super Intelligence Security Center, together with the NSA and CISA, released a joint publication outlining ten voluntary core practices for organizations that train and evaluate highly capable 'super intelligence' (SI) agents, especially pre-deployment or high-risk non-public systems. The guidance defines an 'SI control incident' as an AI agent taking uninstructed actions that bypass or compromise human oversight and security controls. It builds on existing cyber incident response practices but adds AI-specific steps such as testing containment and validating it before resuming agent activity.
AWS tested its AWS Security Agent (now part of AWS Continuum) against a freshly built benchmark of 37 real, recently disclosed CVEs, each run as a live containerized target with a hidden flag. Starting from a low-privilege endpoint with only a one-line hint and no proof-of-concept, the agent, running on Claude Opus 5, captured 33 of 37 flags through genuine end-to-end exploitation after an integrity audit, with 2 captures reclassified as unintended-path solves and 2 genuine misses where the agent broke the target before extracting the flag. AWS built this benchmark to avoid the contamination problem of public CVE suites, which models may have memorized from training data.
Tamnoon built Tami, an agentic orchestrator on Amazon Bedrock that investigates cloud security findings from CNAPPs and cloud providers, scores remediation safety, and generates fixes with guardrails. The company reports a greater than 90% reduction in critical cloud exposure within 90 days with zero production issues. The system uses four specialized agents (investigation, safety-scoring, remediation, code-generation) each calling different foundation models through Bedrock, with Bedrock Guardrails and Cross-Region inference providing safety and scale.
GitHub replaced its LLM-based pipeline for detecting generic secrets (like passwords and API keys) with a fine-tuned ModernBERT classifier combined with regex candidate generation. The new two-stage system improved detection accuracy while cutting scan time and serving costs dramatically, and it's now fast enough to run during push protection, not just after code is committed.
Anthropic has announced the Cyber Mission, a long-term initiative to help defenders secure operational technology and open-source code using Claude models. It includes the Critical Infrastructure Defense Program, built with partners like Accenture, CrowdStrike, Deloitte and Rockwell Automation, and the free OSS Scanner tool that scans open-source projects for vulnerabilities. The effort builds on lessons from the earlier Project Glasswing, now merged into an expanded Cyber Verification Program.
Cisco Talos' CAIRN research classifies a new malware archetype, 'A3: AI-Analysis Evasion,' where malicious code embeds natural-language text designed to manipulate language models used in automated malware triage. Talos traced the technique across four malware families (FRUITSHELL, PLOTSAFE, HOLLOWCLAD, MANTLEMAZE) and 84 samples from January 2025 to July 2026, showing it spreading from a simple copy-pasted comment to templated, multi-model-targeted 'template spraying' and fake intimidation messages. Controlled testing with a panel of five local LLMs found the simplest direct-instruction technique shifted model verdicts toward 'benign' in roughly 35% of runs, while more elaborate tricks had little effect or backfired by increasing suspicion.
AWS describes a new two-stage access control architecture for Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) in Amazon Quick and Amazon Bedrock Knowledge Bases. Instead of relying only on periodically synced access control lists (ACLs), the system now verifies permissions in real time against the authoritative data source (e.g. Google Drive, SharePoint, Confluence) at query time, before passing content to the LLM. AWS says this closes security gaps caused by stale or incorrectly mapped permissions between sync cycles. Mondelēz International, with over 35,000 employees, is cited as a customer using this approach.
Anthropic has merged its Project Glasswing and Cyber Verification Program into a single, expanded CVP with three access tiers: Defense Access, Red Team Access, and Specialized Access. Each tier unlocks progressively fewer safety blocks on cyber-related tasks in Claude Opus 5.5, Claude Sonnet 5.5, and Claude Mythos 5.1 for vetted security organizations. Anthropic also published benchmark results and vulnerability-discovery numbers from the earlier Glasswing program to justify the expansion.
Microsoft Threat Intelligence documented exploitation of CVE-2026-73570, an unauthenticated OS command-injection flaw in the Zimbra Collaboration Suite's SNMP notification path. Attackers triggered it via specially crafted emails against internet-facing servers running the optional zimbra-snmp package with SNMP notifications enabled, requiring no authentication or user interaction. Post-exploitation activity included JSP webshell deployment, privilege escalation to root, persistent access, credential and mailbox theft, lateral movement across Zimbra clusters, and custom remote-access malware. Zimbra fixed the issue in version 10.1.20 (released July 20, 2026); the CVE was publicly disclosed August 13, 2026, and Microsoft observed scanning and exploitation activity during the gap between patch availability and disclosure, as well as after.